Washington Law Review
Volume 45

Number 1

3-1-1970

Thou Shalt Not Fill Public Waters Without Public
Permission—Washington's Lake Chelan Decision
Charles E. Corker
University of Washington School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Water Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Charles E. Corker, Thou Shalt Not Fill Public Waters Without Public Permission—Washington's Lake
Chelan Decision, 45 Wash. L. Rev. 65 (1970).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol45/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

THOU SHALT NOT FILL PUBLIC WATERS
WITHOUT PUBLIC PERMISSIONWASHINGTON'S LAKE CHELAN
DECISION
Charles E. Corker*
On December 4, 1969, the public won a significant victory in the
Supreme Court of Washington. The court ordered defendants who
had filled their lands, which are seasonally inundated by the waters of
Lake Chelan, to remove the fill because it obstructed the rights of
plaintiffs and the public to swim, boat, fish, bathe, recreate, and navigate in the waters of the lake.' This principle applies to all navigable
waters of the state The sweeping character of the decision is demonstrated by the narrow ground on which three of the judges dissented,
in part, to Judge Mathew W. Hill's majority opinionY The dissenters
would have allowed the fill to remain, because it was on land above
what had been the natural level of Lake Chelan before a hydroelectric
project initiated in 1927 caused the lake surface to fluctuate seasonally.
The court's opinion is as noteworthy for its sound common sense

*Professor of Law, University of Washington; A.B., Stanford, 1941; LL.B., Harvard,
1946.
'Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. Dec. 2d 307, 462 P.2d 232 (1969). The original caption of the case from the typescript opinion was, with my emphasis added: "CHARLES
S. WILBOUR and HARRIET G. WILBOUR, his wife, and CHESTER L. GREEN and
RUBY GREEN, his wife, on behalf of themselves and all other residents and property
owners in the Town of Chelan, State of Washington and all other members of the general
public similarly situated, Respondents and Cross-appellants, v. NORMAN G. GALLAGHER and RUTH I. GALLAGHER, husband and wife, Appellants." No. 39444, En
Banc. A partial dissent was written by Judge Marshall A. Neill, and concurred in by
Chief Justice Hunter and Judge Donworth.
The clerk advised counsel by letter of January 8, 1970:
Because of the widespread interest and importance of the decision filed in the
referenced case, the Chief Justice has by notation order entered on January 8, 1970
granted an extension of time until February 16, 1970 in which to file a petition for
rehearing.
-In
this article's caption I have substituted "publie for "navigable?' Neither word,
however, says a great deal except in context. Analysis is always necessary to separate the
meaningful part of the law from its rhetoric. Why else should the Supreme Court's 1969
holding be worthy of comment 52 years after the legislature declared, in Section 1 of
the Water Code of 1917, WAsH. Rav. CODE § 90.03.010: "Subject to existing rights all
waters within the state belong to the public . . "? (emphasis added).
'77 Wash. Dec. 2d at 319, 462 P.2d at 240.
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as it is for its result. It ignores metaphysical doctrine4 which might or
might not have produced a different result, and which in any case
would have left future development of the law in vast uncertainty.5
The decision rests on a recognition of the public uses which lakes,
beaches, bays, and estuaries serve, and of the reasons why ownership
of land beneath their rising and falling waters is essentially different
from ownership of land which is always dry.
A clear understanding of this decision by the bar, by the public,
and particularly by those who make and administer the state and
local laws of Washington, is important for two reasons. First, it would
be easy to ignore the decision because its precise facts may never
recur except on Lake Chelan. Second, as the court was at pains to
point out, the decision leaves unresolved serious and important problems which unaided judicial power cannot solve. The future of this
state's public resources will depend upon the effectiveness of our re-

"[W ater law is a shibboleth-ridden, metaphysical, almost religious field, but also
one of great practical economic importance." Schwartz, Federalism and Anadromous
Fish: FPC v. Oregon, 23 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 535, 537 (1955). Clearly water is of great
economic importance, but cynics have suspected that water law has been of economic
importance principally to its practitioners. In fact, however, the great and spectacular
water cases to which these cynics point have mostly occurred because of the regrettable
tendency to use far more care and foresight in building physical structures like dams,
ditches, and aqueducts than in the legal engineering which controls how and for whom
those structures are to be used. Hoover Dam, involved in Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546 (1963), 35 years after Congress authorized it, is a large example. Norman G.
Gallagher's trailer court on Lake Chelan, to be abated if Wilbour v. Gallagher becomes
final, is a small example.
The unanswered and unanswerable questions about problems like those of the Wilbours
and the Gallaghers, only some of which will be touched on here, point up the pressing
need for systematic study directed primarily toward legislative answers to the problems.
'For example, the court might have expressly overruled Esenbach v. Hatfield, 2
Wash. 236, 26 P. 539 (1891), and its progeny, which have been read as declaring that
there are no riparian rights in Washington's navigable waters. The court was wiser to
treat Eisenbach v. Hatfield with silence. Not the least of the vices of that case was its
roots in Article XVII of the Washington Constitution, beyond legislative power to
alter or amend.
Nor would it have been appropriate, in the Lake Chelan opinion, to overrule cases
like Palmer v. Peterson, 56 Wash. 74, 105 P. 179 (1909), which affirmed a decree restraining trespass by foot or by boat on Puget Sound tidelands purchased under Laws
of 1895, ch. 24, 36-39, authorizing sale of oyster lands with reversion to the state if
purchased lands should no longer be used to raise oysters. On identical facts, one might
anticipate in the light of Lake Chelan the court would inquire, and limit the injunction
if appropriate, to trespass which interferes with oyster growing and harvesting. Certainly
Lake Chelan does modify the court's broad language in 1909 that conveyance of exclusive
possession "is not a substantial impairment of the interest of the public in the navigable
waters of the state." 56 Wash. at 76, 105 P. at 180. That 1909 doctrine has been dead,
however, at least since 1955 when the Washington Court decided Kemp v. Putnam, 47
Wash. 2d 530, 288 P.2d 837 (1955), which recognized a right to fish as a public right
in navigable water. See note 49, infra.
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sponse to the opportunities and responsibilities for conservation and
wise management which the court has now unmistakably identified.
The essential facts which make the decision significant as a precedent are quite simple. Lake Chelan is located in central Washington,
in a glacial gorge 55 miles long and a mile or two wide. It is deep,
cold, beautiful, and navigable, although the court noted only the last
of these characteristics. Its level now fluctuates annually up to 21
feet vertically." Defendants' land is above the lake level for most of
the year; but when the lake is high, during spring and summer
months, their land is submerged to depths between three and 15 feet.
In 1961, defendants commenced filling their land to an elevation five
feet above the high water level, to accommodate two trailer courts.
Plaintiffs sued on behalf of themselves, residents and property owners
of the Town of Chelan where the real estate is located, and members
of the public similarly situated, to compel abatement of the fill. The
individual plaintiffs were two resident homeowners whose land was
located partly above, but in each instance more than one-half below,
the high water line.
The trial court held that the defendants' fill was a wrongful invasion
of a public prescriptive right: the court found that there had been
open, notorious, adverse, and uninterrupted use by the general public
(including plaintiffs and their predecessors) of the waters covering
defendants' land, "for fishing, boating, swimming and for general
recreational uses."7 Nevertheless, it refused to order abatement. That
refusal was based on estoppel, the factual basis of which is not indicated by the Supreme Court. Instead, the trial court awarded damages
for the lessened value of the plaintiff's properties-$1 1,000 to Mr. and
Mrs. Green, and $8,500 to Mr. and Mrs. Wilbour. These sums would
have compensated principally for plaintiffs' loss of view, but would
also have paid for their inability to use the water over the filled land,
and an unsightly algae problem on their beaches caused by the fill.
The fill restricted, but did not wholly cut off, the plaintiffs' access
to the lake at high water. The trial court also determined-anticipating

6
The court expressed uncertainty about whether the lake has ever reached the established maximum of 1,100 feet above sea level. 77 Wash. Dec. 2d at 310 n.7, 462 P.2d at
234 n.7. Nor is it clear the extent to which the 1,079 natural elevation was subject to
fluctuation.
77 Wash. Dec. 2d at 313, 462 P.2d at 237.
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that the Supreme Court might order the fill abated-that alternative
damages would be $1,800 per year until abatement were completed.
Defendants appealed; plaintiffs cross-appealed from the denial of
abatement.
The Supreme Court remanded and ordered abatement of the fill.
While it described plaintiffs' claim based on prescription as "an excellent case," it based its decision on the determination that "the fills
made by the defendants constitute an obstruction to navigation."' It
also remanded the case for a new trial, because it considered damages
of $1,800 per year until completion of the abatement to be excessive.
Two factors were noted in reducing the damages: (1) the trial court
underestimated the time which would elapse in the appellate process
before abatement; and (2) the plaintiffs would not suffer a loss of view
for the whole year, but only for that portion of the year during which
the lake would cover defendants' lands were it not filled.
The foregoing, I think, are all the essential facts. Additional facts
may complicate, but none of them weakens the clear and important
holding: ownership of lands beneath navigable waters does not give
the owner a right to restrict use of those waters for all the public purposes to which they are suited. This is true even though the lands are
submerged only part of the time.
The most important additional fact is that both the defendants'
lands and plaintiffs' lands were above the natural level of Lake Chelan
which existed before the hydroelectric project was initiated in 1927.
None of the lands were contiguous to the lake at that natural level.
Thus, defendants' fill destroyed no natural or God-given advantage
belonging to the plaintiffs or to the public.9
This fact strengthens, rather than qualifies, the holding. Indeed, it
is the major basis of the dissent: 1"
The periodic flooding involved here is entirely different from a natural
raising and lowering of the lake level by reason of rains, seasonal runoff,
8

Id. at 314, 462 P.2d at 237.
'This, of course, is true only in the Pickwickian sense which the law has conventionally employed in confining riparian water rights to riparian or contiguous land.
Before 1927, plaintiff's predecessors and the public had a "right" to the enjoyment of
Lake Chelan at its natural 1,079-foot elevation. The "right" they now have, as a result of
the Supreme Court's decision, is to a Lake Chelan fluctuating between 1,079 and 1,100
feet. It would be realistic to say that at 1,100 feet the lake which God gave plaintiffs and
the public is in summer submerged under 21 feet of water, and the court has recognized
a right to a 1,100 foot lake in substitution for the submerged lake.
1077 Wash. Dec. 2d at 322, 462 P.2d at 242. Emphasis is in original.
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and drought. In the latter instance, the littoral owner's rights to the foreshore lands between high and low water, whatever these rights may be, are
subject to the public's navigation rights. Here, the defendants' lots, all of
which lie above natural high water, are not subject to public navigation
rights unless there has been a voluntary conveyance, eminent domain
proceedings, estoppel, or loss through prescription. Unless precluded by one
of the aforementioned reasons, defendants have the right to use 'their lots,
including the right to change the grade thereof, in order to make any lawful
use thereof. Accordingly, I do not agree that the fill on defendants' lots is
unlawful. They should not be required to remove it.
The dissent gives no other reason why a lake which fluctuates artificially should be treated differently from a lake which fluctuates from
natural causes.
Instinctively, I would agree that a lake level created by God is
entitled to greater respect than a lake level created in 1927 by the
Chelan Electric Company, Inc. But so long as the man-made lake level
is lawful and promises to continue indefinitely, there is no functional
difference between the works of God and man with respect to all the
uses to which a lake may be put-swimming, boating, bathing, recreating, and navigating. Indeed, were we to postulate that the right to
swim or otherwise traverse the surface of a lake terminates at the
natural high water line-and that is the position of the dissent-we
would have to conclude that the raising of the lake in 1927 terminated
its usefulness for every purpose and at all times during which its
surface is above the natural water level, except for lake users who
travel by air. Only float planes are likely to navigate a lake if there
is no right to approach the shore. Nor will many swimmers enjoy the
waters of the ocean if they are denied access to the beach.:"
Depending on facts not disclosed in either the majority opinion or
the partial dissent, it is conceivable that the defendants might have
made a better case. If in 1925, before the hydroelectric project was

'Fluctuating lake surfaces are rarely as desirable as non-fluctuating surfaces. A detailed study of the solutions to Lake Chelan's problems, which Judge Hill's opinion
invites, would investigate whether the hydroelectric license by the FPC might have
required maintaining Lake Chelan at an approximately constant 1,100 foot (or some
other) level, whether this is a presently feasible alternative, and whether a constant
level should or could be achieved after the 50-year license of the Lake Chelan Public
Utility District expires.
This footnote is a reminder that many optimum solutions are available to the Washington Legislature only through log-rolling of the non-invidious type which has come to
be known as cooperative federalism.
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initiated, defendants' land had been lawfully filled to an elevation
which turned out to be 5 feet above the water level authorized in
1927, it is unlikely that the sponsors of the power project would have
thought it necessary to acquire a flowage right to inundate that land
in its natural (pre-1925) state with fill removed, even though removal
would have slightly augmented the quantity of stored water available
for generation of power. And, conceivably, the flowage right acquired
by the project could have been acquired at a slightly lower cost had
the terms of the acquisition expressly reserved to the owners of the
land to be submerged the right to take defensive measures against
rising waters by diking, filling, or floating structures on the submerged
land. This, however, is an improbable situation, best left for future
decision if such facts are ever clearly presented.
The precise nature of the flowage rights acquired by the hydroelectric project is not clear from the court's opinion, and apparently
it was not clear from the record. 2 However, the court provided a
wise precedent, I think, in assuming that, absent a showing to the
contrary, those rights comprehended the same use of the lake at its
new seasonal level as at its prior natural level."3 The right to fill should
4
not depend on whether a lake level is artificial or natural.'
' The court notes that title to defendants' property below the 1,100-foot level is
deraigned through deeds which make the property subject to "the perpetual right . . .
to perpetually inundate and overflow" defendants' property to 1,100 feet. The court
"did not inquire" who could enforce the right. 77 Wash. Dec. 2d at 315 n.11, 462 P.2d
at 237 n.11.
The court's opinion indicates that a half or more of plaintiffs' two properties were
below the 1,100-foot elevation, but it is not clear whether the residence on one or both
of the two properties is also below the high water line, and therefore constitutes "fill."
Would a plaintiff guilty of the conduct about which he complains in defendant, although
less egregious in degree, be denied (a) specific equitable relief, (b) money damages in
lieu of such relief? Be it remembered that this is an action in behalf of, inter alia, "all
other members of the public similarly situated." See full caption of case, note 1, supra.
' If a lake surface is lawfully raised, any public or private rights attaching to the
former surface must either (a) attach to the raised surface, or (b) disappear. The
choice of these alternatives seems clear. No one would advocate out loud destroying all
public and private rights in Lake Chelan during its season of high water, which corresponds with its season of maximum use. If a lake-raiser paid for those rights, his bill
from the public would be enormous. A mechanism by which payment would be made
to members of the public in proportion to their loss does not exist.
Which is another way of saying a lake is a lake, whether its surface is natural or
artificial. An agreement by the public utility with all the littoral owners around Lake
Chelan to surrender all rights in the lake should be either (a) void as against public
policy, or (b) ineffective as to the public rights which littoral owners share and
enjoy, but do not exclusively "own".
"An additional fact of conjectural significance is that defendants' fill covers not only
defendants' land, but also streets and alleys quit-claimed to the municipal predecessor of
the Town of Chelan in 1891 and dedicated for that purpose. These streets and alleys
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ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE
The 1969 Lake Chelan opinion leaves some questions unanswered.
It also raises some questions which earlier did not exist or, more accurately, were not clearly perceived.
1. Must all fills in navigable waters be abated?
The court's opinion is undeniably tough:"'
...the defendants' fills, insofar as they obstruct the submergence of the
land by navigable waters at or below the 1,100 foot level [to which the
lake was seasonally raised], must be removed. The court cannot authorize
or approve an obstruction to navigation.
A footnote appended to the first sentence just quoted reads, 16
We come to this conclusion with some reluctance since there have been
other fills in the neighborhood about which there has apparently been no
protest.
There is no reason however, to believe that the court has set its face
unalterably against all equitable doctrines of repose-such as laches,
estoppel, abandonment, or refinements of the concepts of public rights
based on use and community usage." But the court has emphasized

were vacated in 1927 when the hydroelectric project was initiated, and the project's
sponsors simultaneously quit-claimed them to the town for itself and the public in
perpetuity for access to the lake at all levels. All nine members of the Court agreedalthough apparently the trial court did not-that the fill on these streets must be
abated. If the Supreme Court had decided no more than this, it appears that one of the
defendants' two trailer courts would have been rendered useless to all but amphibious
trailers.
This street dedication may have made the result some vhat easier for the court to
reach, demonstrating that the town and the project sponsors contemplated, when the
power project was planned, that the lake should continue as a great public resource. I
would hope, however, that this would always be true; that even if it were not clear, in
a particular case, that a court should give everyone concerned the benefit of presumed
good intentions even if actual intentions were in fact very bad.
x 77 Wash. Dec. 2d at 317-18, 462 P.2d at 239.
Id. at 317 n.13, 462 P.2d at 239 n.13.
" Strand v. State, 16 Wash. 2d 107, 132 P.2d 1011 (1943). Estoppel under state law
ultimately resolved-and against the state's tideland grantee City of Los Angeles-the
tideland boundary issue litigated in Borax Consol. Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10
(1935). City of Los Angeles v. Borax Consol. Ltd., 102 F.2d 52 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
307 U.S. 644 (1939). See Corker, Where Does the Beach Begin and to What Extent is

that a Federal Question? 42 WASH. L. REv. 33, 36 n.7 (1966), for a summation of the five

reported Borax opinions, of which the last cited concluded the boundary issue. This
suggests that it may, if possible, be better for a court to try any estoppel, laches or
similar issues first to see if deciding the merits can be avoided. Legislative decision
making, by contrast, is easier and better if made on the merits.
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the great weight of the burden which must be sustained if investments
which result in unauthorized obstructions of navigable waters are,
under any circumstances, to be protected by such equitable devices.
A major legal problem still unresolved is the extent to which the
state has, by selling tide and shore lands, already expressly or impliedly
authorized its grantees to fill these lands. Do any such grants by the
state present a case different from the Lake Chelan case, where the
filled land apparently never had belonged to the state?"8
We may expect pressures to treat such tide- and shore-land grants
as authority for fills in navigable waters. The limits on the power

' I have deliberately left all questions about particular Washington statutes under
which particular tide and shore land grants have been made in Washington as beyond
the scope of this paper. Nothing in the Lake Chelan opinion forecloses any argument
which the immediate or remote grantee under such a statute may hereafter wish to
advance. However, even when a statute is express in the authority given the grantee
to fill, and is neither modified nor repealed, there are a great many hazards to the
exercise of that authority to fill.
In Florida, a developer is seeking to create by fill an 11.5-acre island rising from the
salt waters of Boca Ciega Bay to accommodate a trailer court. His conveyance
carries a statutory right "to bulkhead and fill" the land which the state conveyed to him.
First, a hearing examiner for the Pinellas County Water and Navigation Control Authority, next the Authority, and later a Florida District Court of Appeal denied the right to
fill, based on a Florida statute permitting local governments to regulate fills. Zabel v.
Pinellas County Water and Navigation Control Authority, 154 So.2d 181 (Fla. Ct. of
Appeal 1963). The Florida Supreme Court reversed, four to three, 171 So.2d 376 (1965),
holding that the regulatory statute as construed below would arbitrarily deny owners of
submerged land the right to use their property, and without compensation.
The controversy next emerges in Zabel v. Tabb, 296 F. Supp. 764 (M.D. Fla. 1969),
where Judge Ben Krentzman ordered the District Engineer, Army Corps of Engineers, and
the Secretary of the Army, to issue the necessary permit for the filling of navigable
waters of the United States under Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,
30 Stat. 1151, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1964). The District Engineer had found that the fill
would not adversely affect navigation, but that it would harm fish and wildlife resources, would be inconsistent with the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1958 (72
Stat. 563 (1958), 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-64 (1964)), and would be against the public interest.
The judge concluded that the Army Engineers' authority is limited to "navigation" and
does not include the matters on which denial of the permit had been based. He rejected
the argument that because the 1958 Coordination Act directs consultation by the Secretary
of the Army with state wildlife administrators and with the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, the Act necessarily broadens the Army
Engineers' authority. He noted that the legislative history of the Coordination Act
contains express disclaimers of any intent to give conservation agencies a veto power
over water development programs.
The opinion concludes by granting defendants' motion to stay pending appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 296 F. Supp. at 771. We can hope
for either (1) a reversal, or (2) an explanation why Congress directed a purposeless
consultation in which the consulting agency is powerless to act on information obtained
by consultation. In defense of judge Krentzman, it should be said that the culprit is
Congress, which has left the Army Corps of Engineers subject to impossible pressures to
act as a local planning commission, but with no direction, no criteria, and no guidelines
other than the venerable fragment of an 1899 law passed when "navigation" did indeed
refer to vessels, and congressional power to accomplish more was not suspected.
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of the legislature to grant such authority, while uncertain, are broad.
Questions which will require detailed examination relate to construction of past and present items of legislation by which tide and shore
lands have passed to private ownership, and the extent to which such
grants by the state may (or should) be made irrevocable against
future legislative action.19
The equities in favor of those who have acquired state tide and
shore lands and have already filled them are not inconsiderable. In
addition to the terms of the legislation which authorized the particular
grants, the factors to be considered in weighing these equities include
(a) the price paid to the state by the original grantees, (b) the extent
of structural improvements already in place, and (c) the appropriateness of structures and improvements to further or hinder the optimum
use of the public resource for the public purposes which long ago led
the United States Supreme Court to declare that these lands belong to
the state as successor to the British sovereign.20
I think the most significant element in the policy judgments, which
must be primarily legislative, should be the extent to which the private
interest consists of improvements irrevocably made before the date of
"' Legal planners should consider limiting state created rights in tide and shore lands to
fixed terms, like licenses under the Federal Power Act, which are limited to periods not
exceeding fifty years. 16 U.S.C. § 799 (1964). This will obviously not satisfy those who
would prefer a fee simple absolute conveyance to themselves of all public and private
rights, but they might be assured in many situations that the hazard of having well laid
and costly plans upset short of fifty years is less under a statute which licenses for that
term than under a statute which attempts what may well be impossible-the permanent
and absolute grant of a right which is inalienable. Clearly the state's power of eminent
domain cannot be surrendered. The issue is compensability. Term rights which cannot be
revoked without compensation short of the stated term could, I think, be coupled with
contract provisions fixing reasonable compensation payable in the event of revocation
which might withstand state legislative attempts at alteration.
'Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
By the common law, both the title and the dominion of the sea, and of rivers and
arms of the sea, where the tide ebbs and flows, and of all the lands below high water
mark, within the jurisdiction of the Crown of England, are in the King. Such waters,
and the lands which they cover, either at all times, or at least when the tide is in,
are incapable of ordinary and private occupation, cultivation and improvement; and
their natural and primary uses are public in their nature, for highways of navigation
and commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the purpose of fishing by all the King's
subjects. Therefore the title, jus privatum, in such lands, as of waste and unoccupied
lands, belongs to the King as the sovereign; and the dominion thereof, jus publicum,
is vested in him as the representative of the nation and for the public benefit.
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894).
The jus publicum, or public right, the Washington court has said, cannot be disposed
of by the state to the injury of the public. The state's grantee of the jus privatum, or
private right, holds as did the state subject to the rights 6f the public. See Hill v. Newell,
J- "
86 Wash. 227, 231, 149 Pac. 951, 952 (1915).
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the Lake Chelan decision on December 4, 1969, as opposed to the
extent to which the private interest represents mere expectations.
Arguments will be heard from those who have made no "improvements," but who have paid large sums for tide- and shore-lands which
they now hope to "improve." These are unlikely to be original grantees
from the state-whose payments to the state were small-but rather,
investors who have purchased from other private persons. Their losses
would be no less painful than the losses by those who own existing
improvements which they might be compelled to abate. Do these
people have mere "expectations" or do they have much more than
"expectations"?
Expectations which are not properly discounted by the possibility
of federal exercise of "the navigation servitude" may be inflated. 2'
The power of the state under doctrines which are not quite so readily
labeled are another discounting factor. 22 After December 4, 1969, there
can clearly be no reliance on a compensable right (in the fifth amendment sense) in improvements which are made without legislative
authority over the tide- and shore-lands of the state, whether publicly
' Constitutional doctrines relating to federal commerce power over navigable waters
and compensability for their takings are treated in Morreale, Federal Power in Western
Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule oj No Compensation, 3 NAT. RES. J. 1
(1963); 2 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, ch. 7 (Morreale 1967); Harnsberger,
Eminent Domain and Water Law, 48 NEB. L. Rsv. 325 (1969). Like most of the writers
on this subject, both emphasize the constitutional limits of legislative power. This emphasis sometimes tends to create an unarticulated assumption that Congress should go
(or has gone) to the constitutional limits of that power. Thus Professor Morreale writes
(2 Clark at 15 supra) that "prudence alone would make it advisable for the United
States to precede the appropriation of particular waterways with an 'express assertion'
of its superior power." I would prefer to say that "justice alone would make it advisable
for Congress to allocate costs of public improvements to the public, rather than to visit
them fortuitously on private individuals, at least within limits more refined than the
Supreme Court has thus far developed in its constitution decisions." See United States
v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
'See Harnsberger, note 21 supra, at 442-45, for an appropriate criticism of a state
"navigation servitude" which resulted in uncompensated destruction of a shipyard for
benefit of a highway in Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr.
401 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968). Those who, like this writer, both condemn
Colberg and praise Lake Chelan can be called on to give reasons for a distinction. There
are several, the most obvious being that the state was asserting its own rights in Colberg,
whereas the Gallagher's fill was unauthorized. I would hope, however, that even if the
state had built that trailer court in Lake Chelan to the injury of the Wilbours and the
Greens, the state would pay them for the injury. The fact, I fear, is that I am a reactionary who wants to make change (note the absence of any distinction related to the
character of the change) more costly by recognizing compensable rights in the status
quo. While the status quo in most instances is the natural environment, I would argue
that the public should also pay, whether constitutionally compelled to pay or not, for
any program to abate the fill on which are located Seattle's Harbor Island or portions
of the business district of down-town San Francisco.
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or privately owned. The wide publicity which the Lake Chelan decision
has already received should serve to put all future "improvers" on
notice.
There are, however, other areas of possible compromise. If the state
either "takes back" or exercises the public rights with which it never
parted, a fair upper limit on the payments made for tide- and shorelands should bear a reasonable and definable relationship to the rate
of taxes paid on those lands prior to December 4, 1969.23 Even that
date might be the subject of adjustment. Should the legislature substitute another date, say 1975, it might prompt the unusual and edifying spectacle of taxpaying owners of tide- and shore-lands clamoring
for increased assessments.
The Lake Chelan decision should cause little concern to those who
have lawfully, according to the best advice then available, improved
tide and shore lands in years past. Nevertheless, public waters, and
lands underlying them, which have not been filled cannot be the subject of constitutionally vested property rights in the same sense as may
lands which are wholly above water. This is the teaching of Illinois
Central Railroad v. Illinois,2 4 an 1892 case in which the Supreme

Court permitted the Illinois legislature to recapture lands underlying
the Chicago Harbor which had been granted to the Railroad by the
state legislature in 1869. In an opinion by Justice Field, whose liberalism never flamed more than pallidly, the Court said: 25
The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole
people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to
leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties, except in
the instance of parcels mentioned for the improvement of the navigation
and use of the waters, or when parcels can be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains, than it can abdicate its police
powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the
peace.
'If taxes are not commensurate with the claimed private investment value of tide or
shore land there are three possible reasons: (1) the assessor has made a mistake, or (2)
the judgment of the market integrated in the tax valuation formula recognizes that the
shore or tideland owner owns only a title heavily cumbered by public rights, or (3)
prospective improvers who have paid heavily for tide and shore lands are in the unfortunate position of the purchaser of Brooklyn Bridge, deserving only (a) sympathy
for their plight, and (b) whatever remedy they may have against the enterprising
vendor.
146 U.S. 387 (1892).
Id. at 453.
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Of course, to Justice Field, "navigation" had to do with shipping and
commerce-not bathing, boating, swimming and recreating. However,
we know the new wine that our environmentally-aroused generation
has poured into the old bottle labeled "navigation." In fact, the wine
is not really new; it is heavily mixed with a variety which is both
ancient and good. The Crown became the owner of these lands beneath
navigable waters (and the interest descended to the American States
and their grantees) due to the realization that private "ownership" of
public waters and lands underlying them is inappropriate or, in the
ordinary sense, impossible.2 6
2. What waters are "navigable" in the sense of the Lake Chelan case?
7
Judge Hill said accurately:1
Lake Chelan is navigable by any test and there is no necessity to resort
to the 'contemporary test' referred to by Professor Charles E. Corker,
i.e., can it 'float a Supreme Court opinion.'
I still defend that characterization as the only currently reliable
test. However, I believe that "navigability" as a word and a concept
may soon be abandoned, and that Judge Hill's opinion is distinguished
by remarkable progress in that direction.2"
My colleague, Professor Ralph W. Johnson, has noted that2

An opinion poll to discover what owners of undeveloped tide and shore lands think
or hope they own, and why, might be of interest. I am sure there are polar differences
between those whose aspirations are to "develop" them (or to sell to someone else who
will), and those whose aspirations are to keep someone else from developing them. The
former tend to be more conspicuously represented by lawyers than the latter.
' 77 Wash. Dec. 2d at 308, n.3, 462 P.2d 233 n.3. The court's quotation' is from Corker,
Water Rights and Federalism, 45 CAL. L. Rav. 604, 617 (1957), an article which otherwise has almost nothing to do with the Lake Chelan problem. I am particularly pleased
with the citation, however, because with time and distance it is now possible for me to
identify the source from whom the remark was cribbed-one of many insightful bits of
wit and wisdom by which Hon. Simon H. Rifkind, Special Master in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), illuminated and lightened three years of trial in that case
in 1956, 1957, and 1958.
'The court "made no attempt to elaborate on the uses corollary or incidental to the
right of navigation." However, it quoted with approval the New Hampshire court's
"somewhat alliterative statement" by which the right to "boat, bathe, fish, fowl, skate
and cut ice" is included. Whitcher v. State, 87 N.H. 405, 181 A. 549 (1935). It noted
the expansion in Minnesota to include water skiing and skin diving. Nelson v. DeLong,
213 Minn. 425, 7 N.W.2d 342 (1942). 77 Wash. Dec. 2d at 317, n.12, 462 P.2d 239
n.12.
Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on Western Lakes and
Streams, 7 NAT. REs. J. 1, 4-5 (1967); cf. Johnson, Riparian and Public Rights to Lakes
and Streams, 35 WAsH. L. REv. 580, 595 (1960).

Washington's Lake Chelan Decision
Some of the relevant uses of the terms ['navigable' and 'navigability']
are:

(1) The English test of navigability to determine title to beds.
(2) The federal test of navigability for determining title to beds.
(3) The various federal tests of navigability in statutes passed under the

(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

commerce clause of the federal constitution.
The various state tests of navigability for determining title to beds.
The various state tests to determine the extent of the public right of
use of the surface for recreation where the bed is privately owned.
The various state tests to determine the extent of the right of other
riparians to use the surface for recreation where the bed is privately
owned.
The various state tests to determine the extent of the public right to
float logs on waters where the bed is privately owned.
The various state tests set forth in statutes for different purposes.

Professor Johnson's analysis serves a valuable function by making
it clear how uncertain any statute or judicial decision must be when
it declares that a body of water is, or is not, "navigable"-unless it
is accompanied by a definition and statement of purpose more precise
than can usually be discovered. Furthermore, as he recognizes, it is
clear that we cannot expect much greater certainty to evolve from
judicial opinions, or from law professors who sift judicial opinions.
The holding of a decision is necessarily confined to the determination
that a particilar body of water at a particular location is, or is not,
"navigable" for the particular purpose necessary to resolve the
particular dispute. Anything else that a court may say about "navigability" is likely to be dictum. The more remote it is from the issue to
be decided, the less useful it is. Perhaps I excessively belabor this point,
but it is more often than not overlooked. Courts tend to cite other
opinions which have determined "navigability" for other purposes as
if all were interchangeable. It is impossible, using either Professor
Johnson's classification or any classification that might be devised, to
state with assurance that a particular lake is "navigable," say, for
purposes one through four, and "nonnavigable" for purposes five
through eight.
These difficulties are compounded by the pervasive assumption that
when the United States Supreme Court or a State Supreme Court has
declared Goose Creek to be navigable (or nonnavigable), the matter is
settled until the decision is reversed or overruled. In fact, this assumption is at war with other settled rubrics, that "navigability" is a
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question of fact,"0 and that a determination of fact in a suit between
Jones and Smith is not conclusive in a suit between McGee and McGillicuddy. 1
In the Lake Chelan case, the court has pointed the finger of responsibility at the legislature. It is, of course, true that a legislature possesses
an authoritative power of classification which a court (and a fortiori a
law professor) lacks. The Washington Legislature could classify all
waters within the state as navigable or nonnavigable for as many
different purposes as fall within the state's legislative competence.
Such an exercise, however, would probably not be very useful.
The Lake Chelan opinion is a landmark on the road to legal realism.
It invokes "navigability" (which identifies a body of decisional law,
and may help if certiorari to the United States Supreme Court is
sought) but it makes clear that the concept, in context, comprehends
the host of activities to which waters like those of Lake Chelan are
best suited. No enumeration can be exclusive, and any partial enumeration can best be judged by its alliterative quality. 2 The Lake Chelan
decision narrows, although perhaps not to the point of extinction, the
conceptual gap between "navigable" and "nonnavigable" waters. A
comparison of this case with Back v. Sariche-the Bitter Lake case
which the Washington court decided in 1968-makes this apparent.
"0"Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable
in fact." The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1871). "Navigability is always a
question of fact." Kemp v. Putnam, 47 Wn.2d 530, 533, 288 P.2d 837, 839 (1955).
" "The fact [of navigability of the Kansas River at Topeka] is of a kind which should
be established once for all, not perpetually retried." Wear v. Kansas, 245 U.S. 154, 158
(1917). This was said by Justice Holmes in the course of an opinion in which the issue
was proprietorship by the state of the bed of the river, and the validity of the state's
charge for extracting sand. Judgment of the Kansas court in favor of the state was
affirmed, in the course of an opinion which upheld the state court's power to take judicial
notice of navigability as against appellant's contention that it was entitled to go to the
jury on the issue of "navigablity in fact."
The decision is now dubious authority for a number of reasons, but how to meet the
need to establish navigability "once for all" is still unresolved. Judicial notice of
navigability of the Colorado was taken in Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931),
in a Brandeis opinion which goes far to establish both the Pickwickian sense of "navigability" and the United States Supreme Court's disposition to take a congressional
declaration of a "navigable" purpose at face value even in a statute authorizing a project
which demonstrably ended any slender claim to all but the pleasure boat variety of
navigation on that river.
3"See note 28 supra.
' 74 Wn. 2d 75, 445 P.2d 648 (1968). Only four of the five judges who joined in the
unanimous opinion by Judge Williams (pro tempore) in the Bitter Lake case, by Department two, participated in the Lake Chelan opinion. Of those four, three were with
the majority in Lake Chelan, while present Chief Justice Hunter joined the partial
dissent.
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Back v. Sarich involved "nonnavigable," 19-acre Bitter Lake in the
north end of Seattle. The court compelled defendant to remove a
partially completed three-story apartment building which intruded
130 feet into the waters of the lake, over defendant's own part of the
bed. The successful plaintiffs were 24 owners of other property on
Bitter Lake whose riparian rights to boat, swim, fish and recreate extended over the entire lake surface, irrespective of the private ownership of portions of the bed 4 The decision ordered abatement despite
a commercial zoning classification by Seattle which permitted apartment buildings in the area occupied by the lake, but did not (I am
told) refer specifically to the lake. The court said that Seattle could
not, and in any event had not intended to, divest plaintiffs of their
valuable property rights by exercise of its police power.
The court did not cite the Bitter Lake case in its Lake Chelan
opinion. Nor, happily, did it attempt to elucidate the esoteric subject
of "riparian rights"; the plaintiffs in Lake Chelan apparently claimed
no such rights because it is conventional legal wisdom in Washington
that (1) riparian rights do not pertain to navigable waters,3 5 and (2)
riparian rights belong only to those whose land is in physical contact
with a natural body of water, which is clearly not helpful to these
plaintiffs whose property was above the "natural" lake level 6 The
Rights of riparian owners to the common use of the entire surface of nonnavigable
Angle Lake were upheld in Snively v. Jaber,48 Wn. 2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956), commented upon by Johnson, Riparian and Public Rights to Lakes and Streams, 35 WASH.
L. REv. 580, 605-10 (1956). The unanimous en banc opinion by Judge Rosellini in that
case insisted that its rule did "not have the effect of making the nonnavigable lake public,
since a stranger has no right to enter upon the lake without the permission of an abutting
owner" (48 Wn. 2d at 822, 296 P.2d at 1019), but nevertheless rights (or other privileges)
were extended to the riparian owners' licensees including guests of a summer resort. The
case is of particular interest because the court upheld, but refused to make permanent,
an injunction restraining renting of boats to the public for two years until Angle Lake
would be built up, and debris and annoyances would then cease.
The bed was privately owned, but private boundaries were undetermined, another
illustration tending to show that "ownership" of underlying land has not been very important compared to who may use the water surface.
""Johnson, note 34, supra, at 601-05 argues that Washington cases in fact support only
the proposition that there are no riparian rights in navigable waters "as against the
state or persons claiming under it." This is both reasonable and persuasive, but who
claims under the state involves a large quasi-theological issue about who "owned" in the
beginning and who really "owns" now all the water. See justice Douglas' synoptic description of the U.S. Department of justice's historic claim that all rights descend from
the King of Spain, France or England through Uncle Sam. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
U.S. 589, 611-12 (1945).
' The litany usually includes a recital that riparian rights are "part and parcel" (some
innovative lawyer will some day say "parcel and part") of contiguous land. Riparian
doctrine was already well entrenched when Benton v. Johncox, 17 Wash. 277, 49 P. 495
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court might have arrived at its result by broadening the definition of
"riparian rights," and law professors are free to speculate that maybe
the court did so. This one thinks that that particular37 label has-at
least in this context-probably survived its usefulness.
The major concrete difference between Bitter Lake and Lake Chelar
relates to who may assert the plaintiffs' right. The defendant in Bitter
Lake, in both fact and theory, probably could have "bought out" all
the objecting riparian plaintiffs.3" The defendants in Lake Chelan, in
theory, could probably not have "bought out" the plaintiffs, who were
suing in behalf of all members of the public similarly situated. The
court's regret that the Attorney General was not present emphasizes
the public nature of the right.39

(1897), quoted with approval from Professor Pomeroy that riparian doctrine is "a natural
law, an inevitable fact, which no legislation can change. Any statute denying this fact
simply attempts an impossibility." 17 Wash. at 282, 49 P. at 497.
"For
the discussion of a recent il-conceived attempt to codify a non-existent rule
about riparian rights to divert and withdraw water, see Corker and Roe, Washington's
New Water Rights Law-Improvements Needed, 44 WASH. L. Rav. 85, 106-30 (1968)_
The provision which we criticize, Ch. 233, § 12 [1967] WASH. S.ss. LAWS 1125, IVASH.
Rav. CODE § 90.14.120, was repealed by Ch. 284, § 23 (1969] WAsH. LAWS lST Ex. SaSS.
2801. Sections 3 through 6 of this 1969 statute, WAsH. REv. CODE §§ 90.22.010, -. 020,
-.030, -.040 deal with minimum flows and levels of "streams, lakes or other public [happily it does not say "navigable"] waters" for protection of wildlife "or other recreational
or aesthetic values of said public waters whenever it appears to be in the public interest
to establish the same." § 3. Section 6 recognizes "stockwatering requirements for stock
on riparian grazing lands which drink directly therefrom."
The legislative policies stated reinforce and are reinforced by the policies of both the
Bitter Lake and the Lake Chelan decisions.
"Bought out" is in quotation marks to avoid metaphysical particularization about
what conceptually happens. "The riparian hereditament is incident to the land and passes
with it by conveyance. For the same reason, it is not severable from the land, although
the right to the use of the water may be conveyed by a proper instrument." 1 R. Cr.KAx,
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 356 (1967).
'See the Lake Chelan opinion, 77 Wash. Dec. 2d at 317-18, n.13, quoted in text
infra at pp. 90-91. I am informed that the Attorney General's office did not learn about the
Lake Chelan litigation until shortly before the case was argued in the Supreme Court.
Curiously, the same thing was true of a recent California decision, Marks v. Whitney,
80 Cal. Rptr. 606 (Ct. of App., 1st Dist., Sept. 10, 1969). This case held, surprisingly,
that the state's grantee of tidelands on Tomales Bay north of San Francisco holds free
of the public trust for purposes of navigation and commerce, with a right to fill and to
develop them so long as access corridor to deep waters is preserved. The California
Attorney General promptly filed a document uniquely titled "Petition for Permission to
join as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants' Petition for Rehearing and Amicus
Curiae Brief in Support of Appellants' Petition for Rehearing," I Civ. No. 24883, Court
of Appeal, 1st Dist., Div. 2, Sept. 25, 1969, as attorney for the State, the State Lands
Commission and San Francisco Bay Conservation Development Commission of California. The burden of the Attorney General's argument is that the state's grantee of tidelands is not authorized to destroy any public easement, and the grantee has no right to
prevent any citizen from exercising the public rights incidental to the granted land.
I think it clear that a statute is needed in both California and Washington to provide
notice to the Attorney General, and standing as a party litigant, whenever the state's
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Until the law is further developed by the court or the legislature, this
difference may be more theoretical than practical. If defendants in
Lake Chelan had elected to satisfy the plaintiffs' money judgment,
rather than appeal, it is unlikely that the fill would ever have been
abated. Of course, if the Attorney General responds to the court's
suggestion that he should be a party to litigation resembling Lake
Chelan, the avenue of settlement between private litigants may be
narrowed or foreclosed. At present, there is no mechanism, so far as
I know, by which the State, represented by the Attorney General,
could accept or elect to take money damages for injury to, or loss of,
the public right.
The narrowed distinction between "navigable" and "nonnavigable"
waters is particularly important for the legislative judgments which
must be made in the aftermath of Lake Chelan and Bitter Lake. Public
solutions by legislation should take into account both kinds of waters.
While mechanisms for adapting solutions to local geographic problems
are badly needed, there is little reason to suppose that we are constitutionally required to complicate the problem further by making distinctions turn on elusive concepts of "navigability."
3. Is prescriptiona better route to the result?
The trial court in Lake Chelan upheld the plaintiffs' rights based
on prescription. The Supreme Court conceded that plaintiffs made
"9an excellent case" 40 on this score, but rested its decision exclusively
on the public's right to navigate. The dissenters devoted most of their
opinion to a rebuttal of the claim that the plaintiffs had a prescriptive
right. I find the dissent, in this instance, persuasive: 4 '
interest in tide and shore lands is in issue. The state's interest should be defined to include
not only a fee interest in wholly state owned tide and shore lands, but also the public
interest which the Washington court (Dawson v. McMillan, 34 Wash. 269, 75 P. 807
(1904)) and the California court has held survive the state's conveyance of the fee.
People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913); Forestier v. Johnson,
164 Cal. 24, 127 P. 156 (1912). For approval by the Washington court of the California
law on public rights, see Hill v. Newell, 86 Wash. 227, 149 P. 951 (1915).
For a possible model of such a statute, relating to constitutional questions, see 28
U.S.C. § 2403 (1964).
Compare WASE. REv. CoDE § 7.24.110 (1956) which provides that in declaratory relief
actions the Attorney General shall be served and is entitled to be heard whenever a
municipal ordinance or franchise is challenged on constitutional grounds, including constitutionality of a statute.
77 Wash. Dec. 2d at 314, 462 P.2d at 237.
'Id. at 320, 462 P.2d at 241.
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Was the use such as to put defendants on notice that a hostile claim was
being exercised so that inaction on defendants' part would deprive them
of the property? I think not. There would be no reason to object to the
boating, fishing and swimming in these waters [overlying defendants'
land] as defendants did not claim a right to the waters. They claim only
the seasonally submerged land. The use of the lake surface was not, in
itself, harmful ,to defendants' property right. A protest would have been
most unnatural as well as unneighborly.
To force property owners to repulse strangers, to require fences and
"no trespassing" signs on beaches, or floating on the water, would be
unfortunate. Yet, I think it may be fortunate that the court was indecisive about the existence of prescriptive rights. Use of the concept of
prescription to protect the public is left for another day, if the means
which the court chose should fail. The "navigation" doctrine almost
surely will fail if the public regulation which the court invited does
not develop; if such regulation does develop, prescription will be
unnecessary.
Here I find helpful an analogy to consumptive-use water rights. At
some stage in the development of water law, prescription serves a
necessary and desirable purpose. But after the public authority has
provided for systematic regulation of the control and acquisition of
water rights, prescription hinders more than it helps. Precisely when
that stage has been reached, is a matter on which lawmakers-judicial
and legislative-may be expected to differ.4" Too stout a position
"Another conceptual route to protect the public's interest in tide and shore lands was
taken by the Oregon Supreme Court in an opinion filed December 19, 1969, captioned Oregon ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671. Defendants appealed from
a decree enjoining them from constructing fences or other improvements in what the
court described as "the dry-sand area between the sixteen-foot elevation contour line
and the ordinary high-tide line of the Pacific Ocean." The court held that "the state has
an equitable right to protect the public in the enjoyment of [an easement for recreation
purposes] by causing the removal of fences and other obstacles." The state concededunnecessarily and inaccurately, I think-that Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967),
established the upland owner's title to the mean high tide line. However, the Oregon
decision seems a happier route to the result than "prescription" because it requires no
hostile and adverse claim of right, but is based on historic custom of use and enjoyment
by the public including aboriginal residents. The court's opinion by Judge Goodwin, and
a concurrence by Judge Denecke make an impressive showing of the antiquity of the
doctrines. Articulation of the doctrines (I use the plural advisedly, but without intensity
of conviction), as the concurring opinion demonstrates, is more difficult than establishing
their existence and ancient lineage.
"WAsH. REv. CODE § 90.14.220 (Supp. 1969), enacted as § 22 of Laws of 1967, ch. 233,
provides that right to use surface or ground waters of the state may not be acquired by
prescription or adverse use. Some of the literature on this subject is cited in Corker and
Roe, supra note 37, at 87 n.9.
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either way, at any particular stage of development, should be avoided.
The court leaves the question in just about the appropriate degree of
arguable uncertainty.
4. Does (a) the public, (b) a contiguous landowner, or (c) a noncontiguous landowner, have a protected right to his view of the
water?
The trial court answered at least parts (b) and (c) of this question
affirmatively, considering the fact that the plaintiffs to whom it
awarded damages, primarily for loss of view, owned land which was
contiguous to the lake only seasonally, and then only in the lake's
artificially elevated condition. The Supreme Court avoided part of
these issues when it ordered abatement, rather than damages for the
lessened value of plaintiffs' property. But this did not wholly avoid
the issues, because the trial court had fixed damages of $1,800 per
year until abatement, if ordered, should be completed. The Supreme
Court held that $1,800 was too much, in part because it included
damages which assumed a year-round view of the water, while for
most of the year the lake is at its natural level 4 Thus, loss of the
view of this water was not damnum absque injuria.
Environmentalists will applaud this aspect of the decision. So do
I.45 It must be recognized, however, as the most tenuous aspect of the
decision. Not only does the surface of navigable water look very much
like the surface of nonnavigable water; enjoyment of the view does
not depend upon the contiguity of the land to the water, but on factors
which an appellate record cannot adequately describe, and such enjoyment requires more sophisticated administration than the judicial
process can provide. Certainly, it is conceivable that contiguity for
the purposes of our "riparian" doctrines could be redefined judicially
or legislatively to include the contiguity of reflected light waves to
the retina of the resident beholder, or, more realistically, it might be
dropped from the catalogue of necessary requisites of riparian rights.
On Lake Chelan, the injury to the view caused by Gallaghers' fill is

Wash. Dec. 2d at 318-19, 462 P.2d at 239-40.
SI do not describe myself as an environmentalist because (a) I fear being read out
of that respectable company for the view expressed in note 22, supra, and (b) I do not
want to be described by any term of more than five syllables, particularly in the absence
of reassurance that the condition is curable.
4477

Washington Law Review

Vol. 45: 65, 1970

more aggravated when the lake is low than when the lake is high. At
high water it is a structure raised only a few feet above lake level. At
low water-the period for which the court allowed damages-it obstructed much more of the plaintiffs' water view. 46
Of course, a trailer court is unlikely to be a thing of beauty in any
location. A camp ground for those who pitch tents-which the court
suggested would not be actionable when the lake is low-might look
worse.
These are problems which the Lake Chelan decision does not solve,
but, on the other hand, it does not aggravate them either. Rather, it
opens up opportunities for legislative solutions, and these must be
adapted to the problems of the land-and-water interface with much
greater sophistication than "riparian" doctrines, dependent on the
contiguity of land and water, have developed.
CONCLUSION
"Navigable" waters now belong to the people of the State of Washington. They are adapted to many uses, but the balance between those
uses cannot be effectively determined by judicial machinery alone. It
is fortunate, however, that this decision came in 1969, when judges,
legislators, and the public had become keenly aware of the pressures
on, and abuses of, our environment.
The situation requires balancing, but the balancing is not a zero
sum game. One man's gain is not another's loss. During World War
II, thanks to a travel program afforded by the United States Navy, I
spent first a year enjoying Miami Beach, and then a year enjoying
Copacabana Beach in Rio. At Miami Beach, the beach belongs to the
hotels, and the public can enjoy it only in small segments after paying
the required tariff. The public cannot even look at large parts of the
Miami beach until they pay that tariff. Copacabana Beach, on the
other hand, lies across a public promenade from the hotels, and while
I do not know to whom it "belongs," all of the public enjoy it. This,
demonstrably, is fortunate both for the public and for the hotels.
The mistake which was made in Miami Beach is unlikely to be

"This anomaly was observed by a staff member of the Review visiting the situs of
the litigation in December, 1969.
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quickly rectified-perhaps never. It makes little difference to that
prediction that the Congress or the State of Florida could constitutionally condemn the hotels for their "dry land value" without regard to
their beach location. 47 The present owners of these properties are
rarely the original "appropriators" of the public domain represented
by the beaches, and their losses would be disastrous if public authority
were exercised to the limit of its constitutional power. It would help,
however, in rectifying such mistakes, if the hotel owners were to
recognize that their investments are, in large part, not protected in the
same way that dry land property is protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments. We would be helped even more in our task of
removing hotels from the beach if the enhanced value of new hotels
on the landward side of the public access to the public beach were
recognized as a "carrot," to help win approval for correction of this
costly historic mistake.48
Our historic mistake in the State of Washington has been the sale
of our tide- and shore-lands. The first and most immediate step toward
correcting that mistake should be, forthwith, to forbid all further

The United States Supreme Court has not decided such a case yet, but I think it
follows from cases like United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956), in
which the Court denied compensation for locational value of a power site. Had the
power plant been installed, I think at least one justice's vote might have been changed.
These issues are comprehensively and skillfully treated most recently by Professor Richard
S. Harmsberger, Eminent Domain and Water Law, 48 Nas. L. RZv. 325, 377-455 (1969).
The court quoted the aphorism from United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S.
53, 69 (1913):
Ownership of a private stream wholly upon the lands of an individual is conceivable;
but that the running water in a great navigable stream is capable of private ownership is inconceivable.
More recently, the California court dropped the same Delphic quotation in Colberg,
Inc. v. State, 67 Cal.2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
949 (1968), where a highway bridge destroyed access to a shipyard and the court denied
compensation. For such a result there can be no adequate justification. Retirement of
the shipyard was a cost of the public improvement, and no reason was stated why that
cost should not be borne by the public. Even those who might put highways at the top
of their priority of values are hurt by such a decision, which cause highways to be regarded more like earthquakes, plagues, and tornadoes in the unpredictability of their
accompanying disasters than like public improvements. An unimproved potential site for
a shipyard, however, stands on a quite different footing.
Fortunately, a decision like Colberg, while "constitutional" in its basis, does not limit
the legislature in the judgments it may make about compensation which should be paid
in addition to that constitutionally required. For a related aspect of a message badly
needing emphasis in a day of judicial activism, see Rodgers, A Holding of 'Not Unconstitutional': Law Reform through Judicial Abstention, 44 WAsu. L. REv. 607 (1969).
" Compare 40 Stat. 911 (1918), 33 U.S.C. § 595 (1964), directing consideration of
special benefits in assessing condemnee's compensation for property taken for rivers and
harbors improvements by the United States.
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sales. The Lake Chelan decision should help to make that decision acceptable, insofar as it declares that purchasers of such lands may not
acquire a clear right to privately exploit the land purchased.49
The second step should be to assert by legislative action public
ownership and administration of all such lands, and the interests
therein, which the state still possesses. Those interests include, but
are not limited to, the fee title interests which the state has by virtue
of the Supreme Court's historic decision in Pollard v. Hagan,5" which
recognized the state as successor to the British sovereign. They also
include the interests which the state may never wholly surrender,
under the rule of Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois."' As a part of
this second step, the state should explicitly adopt a policy of defining,
and protecting against uncompensated takings, the reliance interests
in structures and physical improvements which were lawful when
made. 52
" The Lake Cheian decision puts improvers and developers of tide and shore lands
again on notice of what the Washington Supreme Court declared to be the law
as early as 1904: "By the mere act of selling the land [tidelands on a slough off Bellingham Bay on Puget Sound], the state conferred no right upon them to interfere with the
rights of the public in the use of the highway." Dawson v. McMillan, 34 Wash. 269, 275,
75 P. 807, 809 (1904). Until the legislature acts, or unless the court qualifies the Lake
Chelan decision, the issues of importance can all be framed in terms of that 1904 declaration: (1) What are the rights of the public to tide and shore lands? (2) Have they
been lost by reason of reliance by improvers in particular locations? (3) Is there a particular legislative authorization by which conveyance extinguished the public rights?
(4) To what waters and lands do "rights of the public in the use of the highway" (itself
a term in context which does not exclusively mean highway for vehicles and vessels)
apply? (5) What public remedies are available and who may invoke them?
The latter question the Lake Chelan opinion brushes only lightly. I would hope that
the court's approving citation of Kemp v. Putnam, 47 Wn. 2d 530, 288 P.2d 837 (1955),
does not extend to the restrictive view there taken of standing. The distinction between
a licensed and practising fisherman, who had standing, and the West End Sportsmen's
Club and Washington State Sportsmen's Council, which did not, is not appealing in
terms of the reasons which have shaped standing concepts. Nor is it likely to survive
the fast running tide which produced Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), holding that
a federal taxpayer has standing to challenge a federal statute under the establishment
clause of the first amendment. Mine is not a view that the Supreme Court should or will
soon adopt Justice Douglas' endorsement of the notion of "private attorneys general"
with standing to sue. 392 U.S. at 11.
Kemp v. Putnam was cited by the court for a proposition about which there surely
can be no quarrel: "The plaintiffs have unquestionably sustained special damages as a
result of defendants' wrongful activities, and of a character that sustains their right to
maintain that action, [citations]."
9'44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
'146 U.S. 387 (1892).
2 Compare Coudert, Riparian Rights; a Pervesion of Stare Decisis, 9 CoLtutr. L. Rv.
217 (1909) with Riggs, The Alienability of the State's Title to the Foreshore, 12 CoLum.
L. Pv. 395 (1912), where the debated issue is whether, and if so, to what extent the
state's grantee of tide and shore lands is in a position superior to that of the upland
owner who does not have such a grant. From the vantage point of 60 years later, it is
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The third step should be an inventory of the State's assets, and
adoption of laws which will insure that when the Wilbours, the Greens,
and the Gallaghers litigate on some other shore, or its environs, the
Town, the County, and the State of Washington will be effectively and
powerfully represented.5 3
A fourth step must involve planning (probably by state, town, and
county) for the conservation and utilization of these assets. This will
require manpower resources adequate to the task, including lawyers,
ecologists, engineers, surveyors, and professional planners. I mention
lawyers first, because I think theirs must be a major part of the chore.
That chore includes settling by legislation, by regulation, and by judicial decision, the questions which shroud our lakes, beaches and
estuaries with uncertainty.
One major uncertainty can best be understood by a brief recapitulation of some recent Washington history. In 1966, the Washington
Supreme Court faced, for the first time in 76 years of statehood, the
necessity of deciding the boundary between privately-owned upland
and state-owned tideland in a case involving 561 feet-one-tenth of
a mile from east to west-of disputed land on the Long Beach Peninsula. Two issues were presented to the court in Hughes v. State.54 One
issue, involving 175 of these 561 feet, was whether the state or the
private owner had the right to accretion land, gradually added to the
upland since statehood. The other issue involved the remaining 386
feet, and turned upon whether the boundary is the line of mean high
tide, determined by Coast and Geodetic Survey criteria, or the line
of vegetation determined by both tide and wave action which naturally
delimit a functional beach.5 5 The state prevailed on both issues in the
clear now if it was not dear then that the most difficult task in such a debate is that
of the referee who attempts to frame the debated issues. It is dear that any resolution
requires a refined legislative judgment, less in terms of enacting a law which will dispose
of the problem, than in creating adequate administrative and enforcement machinery
to enable us to live with a problem which will neither go away nor permit itself to be
legislated out of existence.
See note 39, supra.
ra67 Wn. 2d 799, 410 P.2d 20 (1966). That both these issues were unsettled in Washington in 1966 is another demonstration that most tide and shore land boundaries are
delineated by nature, and ordinarily no one cares where a surveyor's line might be run
to delineate "title." This-is the case discussed at embarrassing length in Corker, note 17,
supra.
' On several occasions since the article cited in note 17, supra, was published, I have
been asked whether I am convinced that the 386-foot issue-the difference between
"mean high tide" and the "vegetation line"--was really and truly decided by the Washington Supreme Court. While standing alone some of the language of the opinion would
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Washington Supreme Court. This decision was reversed by the United
States Supreme Court, which dealt in its opinion with only the accretion issue." The case has been publicly invisible since remand, with
only rumor and unpublished records to provide the information that
the 386-foot issue was also resolved in favor of the upland owner."
This ruling is now res judicata in favor of the upland owner and
against the state, both in Hughes and in companion cases where the
parties agreed to abide by the result in Hughes. For other areas of the
state, including even unlitigated reaches of the Long Beach Peninsula,
the 386-foot issue is still unresolved.58
This issue remains important, but is a bit less so since Lake Chelan. 9
make this an arguable question, I think that argument cannot survive close study of
the sketch prepared by the court, 67 Wash. 2d at 803, 410 P.2d at 22. That sketch shows
561 feet separating a line designated "Present USC & G Survey-Mean [court's emphasis]
High Tide" and a line designated "1889 Line of Vegetation (Ordinary High Tide)."
Those 561 feet are separated into two components of 386 feet and 175 feet by an intermediate line designated "1963 Line of Vegetation (Ordinary High Tide)." The difference
between the "1963 Line of Vegetation" and the "1889 Line of Vegetation" is 175 feet
of accretion land, added to the upland since 1889. This 175 feet is what the United States
Supreme Court held belongs to Mrs. Hughes because the original source of her upland
title is a patent from the United States. The 386 feet represent the difference between
"Present [I read this as "1963"] USC & G Survey-Mean High Tide" and "1963 Line of
Vegetation." The United States Supreme Court's opinion says nothing about who owns
that 386 feet.
The State's ownership of both the 386-foot area and the 175-foot area was intensely
argued by the Attorney General in his briefs to the Washington Supreme Court.
'Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
On January 29, 1968, the Washington Supreme Court remanded the Hughes case to
the Superior Court for Pacific County "for further proceedings consistent with the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States." On February 7, 1968, that court
entered a judgment "that the original judgment of this court entered on February 4,
1964 be and the same is hereby reinstated and confirmed as if there had been no appeal."
I am indebted to Hon. William M. Lowry, Clerk of the Washington Supreme Court,
for a copy of that court's order; to Attorney General Slade Gorton and Assistant Attorney General Charles M. Roe for a copy of that of the Superior Court for Pacific
County.
(A footnote to a footnote is needed to provide the further not unimportant information made available by Mr. Lowry. The practice in Hughes is now the ordinary procedure of the court, in contrast to that followed when the Supreme Court of the United
States reversed another Washington decision in Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357
U.S. 320 (1958). The court then rendered but never published a 5-page "judgment" relating to the merits and disposition of the case. The Washington Supreme Court quoted
from this "judgment" in Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 60 Wn. 2d 66, 70-71, 371
P.2d 938 (1962), a separate suit subsequently initiated.)
S'Borax v. Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935), is the major decision
on which Hughes relied. Its holding is discussed in Corker, supra note 17, at 54-72.
The boundary finally settled in subsequent Borax proceedings, also cited in note 17, was
a line fixed by estoppel. The Hughes decisions of state and United States Supreme Courts
establish, in combination, that unreported superior court decisions are of little weight as
stare decisis.
'A recent and striking example of the difficulties which may be encountered in locating the line of mean high tide on the ground is reported in Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Fund v. Wetstone, 222 So. 2d. 10, 11 (Fla. 1969) (5-2 decision), where
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Now the public has a right reasonably to enjoy the navigable waters
of the Pacific Ocean when the tide is in, or of Lake Chelan when the
lake is high. Ownership of land under that water by the state, by Mrs.
Hughes, or by Mr. and Mrs. Gallagher, is not controlling. Perhaps
the title owner may still forbid trespass across his property line whenever his sands are exposed, but he now has less inducement to do soY°
Furthermore, on the ocean, the boundary may shift by accretion and
erosion, and to discover where it is at any particular moment will be
a slow and expensive process.
If the legislature determines to resolve the vegetation-line issue,
both those who want to pull the line inland and those who want it seaward will have reason to think long thoughts about where they really
want it. Mrs. Hughes, who won both the accretion and vegetation-line
issues in her litigation, cannot find out where her property line is
today without great expense, and accretion or erosion can shortly
render that information obsolete even if she does so. The present
vegetation line at least has the advantage of visibility, even though it
too may shift.
Even without legislation, there is reason to hope that the issue might
now be resolved in favor of the vegetation line. The vegetation line
is the title boundary on inland navigable waters, and the "Open Beaches
Act of 1969," introduced by nine representatives in the 91st Congress,
proposes to establish the vegetation line as the upland boundary of
the nation's beaches. This bill proposes that a showing that an area
is a beach, as thus defined, shall be "prima facie evidence that the
title of the littoral owner does not include the right to prevent the
public from using the area as a common."161
the court summarized a surveyor's testimony that "the mean hightide line subscribing
the Island could not be located with any certainty, the allowance for error in its location
varying from several hundred feet to a quarter of a mile. The nearest tide gauging station that gave a verticle [si] reference point (i.e. the elevation of the plane of mean
high-tide above the zero plane of the mean sea level bench marks) was eight miles away
from the Island. This verticle [sic] reference point from which a surveyor would normally run his line would be compounded over the course of eight miles to create an
excessive tolerance on the almost horizontal plane so that such tolerance would vary

from several hundred feet to a quarter of a mile when it reached the Island." The court
adopted the meander line of an 1875 Government survey as the boundary. Neither majority nor dissent cited Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
00This raises issues like those in State of Oregon, ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, note 42,
supra.
' § 105(1) of H.R. 11016, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., introduced May 7, 1969, by Representative Eckhardt (Texas) for himself and Representatives Button (New York), Dingell
(Michigan), Edwards (California), Halpern (New York), Mann (South Carolina),
Mikva (Illinois), Podell (New York), and Udall (Arizona).
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The "Open Beaches Act" is not likely to become law during the
present Congress. Constitutional objections,62 policy objections, and
fiscal objections can be raised (of which the latter two are the most
serious). Federal action to deal with local problems confronts particular difficulties when the problems are inseparable from local geography.
Defining a "beach" would be a far simpler task for the State of Washington than it is for the United States Congress, though only a detailed
survey of the coast and inland waters could satisfactorily determine
how many definitions and variants might be required in Washington.
The fourth step which I have suggested-planning by the state and
local entities for utilization of our tide- and shore-land resourcescan, and perhaps should, be delayed until completion of earlier steps.
The last paragraph of footnote 13 to the Lake Chelan decision might
have been expressly addressed to the Washington Legislature: 63
We are concerned at the absence of any representation in this action by
the Town or County of Chelan, or of the State of Washington, all of whom
would seem to have some interest and concern in what, if any, and where,
if at all, fills and structures are to be permitted (and under what conditions) between the upper and lower levels of Lake Chelan. There undoubtedly are places on the shore of the lake where developments, such as
those of -the defendants, would be desirable and appropriate. This presents
a problem for the interested public authorities and perhaps could be solved
by the establishment of harbor lines in certain areas within which fills
could be made, together with carefully planned zoning by appropriate
authorities to preserve for the people of this state the lake's navigational

The bill proposes to make 75 per cent matching grants for planning, acquisition, or
development of projects to secure the public right to beaches, and further financial assistance through the Secretary of Transportation and approval by the Secretary of the
Interior of the state's effort to define and protect its beaches. It disclaims interference
(§ 102) "with such property rights of littoral landowners as may be protected absolutely
by the Constitution" and declares the intent of Congress "to exercise the full reach of
its constitutional power over the subject."
"Our national obsession with constitutional issues is such that no discussion of Lake
Chelan can conclude without reference to the issue nearly always raised about whether
the state is precluded from acting with respect to navigable waters by federal power.
The answer to this can be concluded by citation of Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh
Co. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829), in which the Supreme Court held that powers of the
state over navigable waters are not hnpaired until Congress acts. See Dawson v. McMillan, 34 Wash. 269, 275, 75 P. 807, 809 (1904) for the summary dismissal of such a
contention.
Even on tideland boundary problems, the state can be more generous to those holding
upland under federal patents than constitutional limitations compel. For a recent application of this principle in Washington, see Anderson v. Olson, 77 Wash. Dec. 2d 241,
461 P.2d 343 (1969).
77 Wash. Dec. 2d at 317, 318 n.13, 462 P.2d 239 n.13.
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and recreational possibilities.6" Otherwise there exists a new type of
privately owned shorelands of little value except as a place to pitch a
tent when the lands are not submerged.

What are the "appropriate authorities" to preserve, protect, and manage this public resource "for the people of this state"? I doubt that
they now exist at any level of government smaller than the state itself.
Moreover, in many areas and many aspects, the problem is not so

much one of needed laws, as it is one of resources needed for their
administration and enforcement. A beach fouled with tin cans, broken
glass, and garbage has a problem which no zoning law or harbor line
law--or any other law which draws boundaries and says "thou shalt
not"---can solve. Indeed, the informed legislative draftsman cannot

even begin his task until the resources available for picking up tin
cans are known and identified. Also, effective planning would be
hazardous without a detailed study by scientific specialists who are
competent to identify, area by area, major alternatives and options,
and the costs of each. A major contribution of the Lake Chelan opinion

is that it makes clear the distinction between the rights of the public
and the ownership of tide- and shore-lands. The state should not pay
for rights which the public already owns (again emphasizing, as
"Whatever devices the law may provide to do this job will fail unless adequate provision is made for administration. For a case in which the courts in effect fixed harbor
lines because those responsible failed over many years to do so, see Judge Hill's opinion
in Grill v. Meydenbauer Bay Yacht Club, 61 Wash. 2d 432, 378 P.2d 423 (1963). The
common sense answer to that dispute was that neighbors of the Yacht Club, which is at
the end of a constricted bay, could not, based on their property ownership, put the
Yacht Club out of action by denying access. It is clear, I think, that the functionaries
who should have established harbor lines, but did not, should have no responsibility for
establishing areas for swimming, fishing, bathing, and the miscellany of activities which
the Lake Chelan case classifies as "navigation."
Harbor lines, to be established in navigable waters of all harbors, estuaries, bays and
inlets within, in front of, or within one mile on either side of any city, were provided
for by Article XV § 2 of the Washington Constitution of 1889, amended by Amendment 15 in 1932. The constitutional provisions appear applicable only to the commercial
or conventional aspects of navigation, and not to the sundry uses to which waters like
Lake Chelan are adapted.
Provisions applicable to tidal waters are contained in Chapter 97, Laws of 1969, Extraordinary Session, amending WASH. REv. CODE § 79.01.512, -.516, -.520. See WAsr.
lev. CODE ch. 88.24 (wharves and landings).

Two important principles emerge from the constitutional and statutory provisions:
(1) Interests of the state are not to be sold, but rather to be leased. (2) WAsH. REv.
CODE § 79.16.380 recognizes, although without constitutional compulsion to do so, a
boundary which will shift to provide continued access when a lake, like Lake Washington, is lowered by the State or by the United States. See State v. Sturtevant, 76 Wash.
158, 135 P. 1035, Petition for rehearing denied, 138 P. 650 (1913). These principles should
commend themselves in formulating legislation which the court indicates in the Lake
Chelan case will be needed. Footnote mine.
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previously noted,65 that this does not necessarily mean ownership in
the fifth or fourteenth amendment sense), and it need not go to the
expense of buying small tracts of land for public parks, when it may be
more necessary and efficient to use the same resources to remove litter
from land on which the fee is privately held.
This program requires money. The preliminaries I have suggested
would not require much, but an effectively administered program for
preserving this resource for the public would require plenty of money.
Planning should also seek sources for that money. Perhaps much of the
money required can be acquired by a reallocation of funds which
would otherwise be spent on land acquisition. 6 Fee titles are not only
unimportant, they are unnecessary where a privately-owned area is
made available for public use. The state will pay nothing for the area
of Lake Chelan now occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Gallagher's trailer
courts. While we cannot expect the Gallaghers to become immediately
enthusiastic about their contribution in expensively abating a fill which
was doubtless expensive to install, theirs may be only a short run loss
if the end result of developments is to make Lake Chelan a nationally
popular recreation area, as it should be. And they should be able to
testify that installing fills and abating them is not the most satisfactory
way of engaging in the trailer court business.
Large numbers of persons in the state of Washington are situated
similarly to the defendant Gallaghers; large numbers are situated
similarly to the plaintiff Wilbours and Greens. All have reason to be
aroused, in one way or another, by the Supreme Court's decision in
Wilbour v. Gallagher.The parties responsible for directing this aroused
energy into a constructive purpose are "all other members of the
See note 21, supra.
For example, the state has acquired water front lots for the purpose of permitting
the public to enjoy fishing rights on the whole of the lakes. This fails unless the state
regulates the public use to prevent unreasonable interference with the rights of other
riparian owners. Botton v. State, 69 Wn. 2d 751, 420 P.2d 352 (1966); Ames Lake
Community Club v. State, 69 Wn. 2d 769, 420 P.2d 363 (1966). See Note, The Tale of
Two Lakes-A New Chapter in Washington Water Law, 43 WASH. L. REv. 475 (1967).
In addition, these cases illustrate several hard realities: (1) A law, whether provided by
the legislature or pronounced by a court, will not work unless resources are provided for
its administration. (2) Public utilization of tide and shore lands and of public waters
requires in most instances exclusive state control of some upland areas. The Lake Chelan
case provides no way by which the state can avoid paying for necessary upland. (3)
Private ownership of land underlying water is a qualified kind of ownership which (a)
lacks any absolute right to exclude others, but which (b) is entitled to regulation and
protection.
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general public similarly situated." It is their response-that is, our
response-which will determine whether this has been a great victory,
or simply another judicial opinion floated on the waters of Lake Chelan,
to expend itself wholly when the trailer courts and the fill beneath
them have been removed.
The opinion is clearly capable of floating on every navigable (read
"public") body of water in Washington. Its principles are exportable,
without need for area-of-origin protection, to every other part of the
land.

